Abstract: This qualitative study examines the motivations for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to act opportunistically toward one another. Structured interviews with 14 employees and five investors in a VC-funded startup revealed that venture capitalists expect opportunistic behaviour from entrepreneurs during investment rounds, but largely trust entrepreneurs between financing rounds. Both the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs reported that venture capitalists act opportunistically towards the entrepreneur and other venture partners during all stages of the startup development. These findings have important implications for entrepreneurship research, most notably, the applicability of agency theory as a theoretical perspective from which to view the complex relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Introduction
Venture Capital (VC) is an important instrument of entrepreneurial finance. In addition to providing risk capital that is often essential to the success of a new firm, venture capitalists are active investors that seek to add value through their interaction with and effective monitoring of the managers of the entrepreneurial firm (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Hsu, 2004; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) . Despite its relatively modest size, VC has an outsised impact on the economy by encouraging innovative activity (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Khortum and Lerner, 1998) . The impact of VC and its capacity to initiate and shape innovative activity is, at least in part, responsible for a substantial and thriving stream of cross-disciplinary research on the topic (Cornelius and Persson, 2006; Wright and Robbie, 1998) .
Venture capitalists take large equity stakes in their portfolio firms and actively engaging with the managers of the entrepreneurial venture from pre-investment to exit. Agency theory is the dominant theoretical perspective used to understand this relationship (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . In the VC context, researchers have attributed the role of agent to the entrepreneur and the principal, to the venture capitalist (De Clercq et al., 2006; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; Reid, 1989) .
Although agency theory has provided a number of valuable insights into the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, a number of unsolved puzzles remain. Agency theory has received mixed empirical support in the VC setting (Landström, 1992; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; . There is growing scepticism concerning the efficacy of agency theory as an overarching explanatory framework for the relationship between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur. In their examination of the boundaries and limitations of agency theory in a VC setting, Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) suggest that the application of agency theory may be limited to a few points in the investment process. They argue that, save for a few 'inflection points' in the relationship, the goals of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur are largely aligned. Where goal congruence exists, there is no agency problem to resolve. Arthurs and Busenitz (2003, p.155) conclude, "a great deal more theoretical work is needed to accurately explain the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship".
This study contributes to this call for additional theoretical work, engaging in an empirical examination of goal (in)congruence between the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs across time. Our research seeks to understand whether it is the case that, save for the initial stages of the relationship, the goals of the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are indeed aligned. We examine goal congruence at key points in the VC process, using the framework of Wright and Robbie (1998) as our starting point and hypothesising an additional point in the relationship where the goals might diverge: a firm in crisis.
Semi-structured interviews with both the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs identify significant goal incongruence between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur across every stage of the relationship. Consistent with Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) , we find evidence of goal incongruence (and associated principal-agent conflict) between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur during the initial negotiation stages. However, we also find clear evidence of goal incongruence across time, suggesting that the rejection of the agency theoretic perspective, based on the grounds of goal congruence, is unwarrranted. Our findings further suggest that the stylised 'venture capitalist-as-principal, entrepreneur-as-agent' framework represents an incomplete picture of this complex relationship. In addition to the oft-researched opportunistic behaviours perpetrated by entrepreneurs, the results indicate that the venture capitalists engage in opportunistic behaviour with entrepreneurs and other venture capitalist firms throughout the development of the startup. Our findings suggest that we need to reconceptualise the principal-agent issue in the VC context if we plan to incorporate an agency theory perspective in VC research.
Theory review
Agency theory has been applied broadly across multiple disciplines including finance, accounting, economics and organisation (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and the field of entrepreneurship is no exception. Agency theory has emerged as the dominant theoretical perspective used to examine the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) .
The agency relationship can be defined as the contract under which one person (the rational economic-maximising principal) engages another person (the rational, economic-maximising agent) to perform some service on their behalf that involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Since it is assumed that the agent and principal are both self-interested and boundedly rational, agency problems arise when the principal and the agent have different risk preferences or goals. Bounded rationality gives rise to information asymmetry between both parties, which provide crafty entrepreneurs with the means to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Adverse selection refers to the potential for an entrepreneur to overstate his or her abilities or the business opportunity to the venture capitalist in order to negotiate better financing terms (Amit et al., 1998) . Additionally, an entrepreneur could engage in another type of opportunistic behaviour, moral hazard: after receiving financing, he or she could simply sit back and do nothing, or even worse, purchase goods which only add value to the agent. As a result, a central concern of entrepreneurial finance has been the examination of the proper incentives and controls to align the goals of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur.
The mechanisms that venture capitalists use to mitigate potential agency conflicts with entrepreneurial firms have been the subject of a number of theoretical studies. It has been suggested that the structure of the VC contract addresses a central issue in entrepreneurial finance, the reduction of opportunistic behaviour by the entrepreneur through the alignment of incentives (Leland and Pyle, 1977) . Effective deal pre-screening and due diligence (Chan, 1983) , post-deal monitoring and advice (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Admati and Pfederer, 1994) , and syndication and staging of investment (Admati and Pfederer, 1994; Bergemann and Hege, 1998) are prominent examples.
Empirical work in a VC context using hypotheses derived from agency theory confirms the potent effect of staged capital infusions (Gompers, 1995) and syndication (Lerner, 1994) as methods to mitigate the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the entrepreneur. In a study of both the venture capitalist-general partner and venture capitalist-entrepreneur dyads, Sahlman (1990) identified potential agency problems in these relationships and reviewed the contractual and operational procedures that had evolved in response to these problems. These included standard operating procedures, specific contractual obligations, the staged commitment of capital, performance-based compensation, and preserving mechanisms to force agents to distribute capital and profits. Similarly, Reid (1989) applies the principal-agent model to investor-investee relations in the UK VC market, concluding that the evidence supports the application of agency theory to the financing of mature small firms.
Despite the valuable insights and general support of agency theory as a framework for understanding the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, questions remain. In their study among venture capitalists of agency risk and task uncertainty towards their ventures, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) monitor the frequency of interaction (suggested as a proxy for monitoring or bonding) between venture capitalists and CEOs. The authors conclude that venture capitalists respond to higher levels of uncertainty with higher levels of interaction, suggesting that agency problems may influence governance of the new venture. However, no support is found for the hypothesis that the degree of management ownership is related to the frequency of interaction. The authors suggest that this paradoxical finding could be due to agency risk being less strongly related to ownership than to its proportion of a manager's income in the firm, or due to a threshold effect: above a certain level of ownership, there is little or no reason to expect incentive-related shirking or opportunism.
In a related study, studied the determinants of interaction in the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur across multiple country contexts. They find that some evidence of increased monitoring by venture capitalists, with mixed results across countries. Landström (1992) conducted a study on the relationship between private investors and small firms in Sweden, testing 25 hypotheses based on agency theory. Of these, only six are supported, 16 are not, and another three show the exact opposite results. Landström concludes that agency theory does not provide a satisfactory framework for the interaction between private investors and small firms.
These inconclusive results have generated a variety of reactions. In response to the non-significant findings on the impact of ownership levels, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) argue that the variables are the issue, not agency theory, and call for research into alternate ownership measures. Others have chosen to examine the venture capitalist relationship from other theoretical perspectives including game theory (Cable and Shane, 1997) , signalling theory (Busenitz et al., 2001) ; and procedural justice theory (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996) .
An under-theorised aspect of the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship is the potential for opportunistic behaviour of venture capitalists in addition to the known opportunism of entrepreneurs. Where agency theory has been either suggested or tested as an explanatory framework, the focus has been on the venture capitalist-principal and the control mechanisms that have evolved or been enacted to protect against the opportunistic agent-entrepreneur. However, a large and growing collection of studies suggests that opportunism in the VC setting goes both ways, with recent research providing examples across all stages of the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship.
Consider a busy venture capitalist deciding where to allocate their time postinvestment. Gifford (1997) studies the effects of time constraints on venture capitalists, noting that the opportunity cost of keeping a business alive might be greater than the expected benefit. As time is the limiting factor, the venture capitalist benefits more by allocating time to other projects that have a higher perceived return and thus terminating funding and time allocation to projects that have a lower perceived value.
Venture capitalists with more open slots on their calendar may not kill projects by failing to allocate time to them, but could simply make inefficient investment decisions as a result of the fund's time horizon. The majority of VC organisations are formed as limited partnerships designed to have a limited life span, typically ten years. The limited lifespan of the fund is part of the contract aimed to reduce agency problems (specifically, holdup) between the venture capitalist and the investor (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1996) . Kandel et al. (2004) develop a model in which the fund time horizon and the informational advantages of the venture capitalist may cause the continuation of bad projects and the termination of good ones. The authors show that in many cases the compensation contract structured by the investors and venture capitalist does not motivate the venture capitalist to monitor good projects. Additionally, career concerns of have been shown to impact VC investment decisions, in particular decisions related to the syndication and staging of follow-on rounds of capital (Baker, 2000) .
Although one might expect the Initial Public Offering (IPO) stage to be a time of tight goal alignment between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist, evidence suggests that this is not always the case. A venture capitalist might act contrary to the interest of a startup by taking the venture public too early, engaging in reputation-building at the expense of the venture. While VC firms can realise returns for their investors through acquisitions, the bulk of their returns are created by taking companies public (Gompers and Lerner, 2004, p.8) . As a result, establishing a reputation as a firm that is capable of taking ventures public is crucial to future fundraising (Gompers, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004) . Gompers (1996) provides examples of VC funds that could not take firms public, and were subsequently unable to raise capital for the next fund. Gompers analyses the activities of young and established VC firms and finds evidence of 'grandstanding' by less-established firms, taking younger, underpriced companies to market early in comparison to established VC firms.
Underpricing of IPOs leads to another opportunity for a venture capitalist to profit at the expense of the entrepreneur (Moore and Wüstenhagen, 2004) . Given that venture capitalists own a substantial portion of the shares of a firm prior to an IPO, why would an established VC firm leave money on the table? Loughran and Ritter (2002) find evidence that the venture capitalist may receive a benefit -the allocation of preferential shares of another IPO firm -in exchange for greater underpricing in the venture capitalist's own firm. Although both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur leave money on the table in the case of an underpriced IPO, only the venture capitalist benefits from this quid pro quo arrangement.
To sum up, a wealth of theoretical and empirical work suggests that startups themselves are ripe for opportunistic behaviour by the venture capitalist far beyond the initial stages of the relationship. We suggest that venture capitalists are equal-opportunity opportunists in this principal-agent relationship: engaging in heavy-handed negotiation in the initial stages of the relationship, shirking their monitoring duties through benign or active neglect, and making self-interested reinvestment and exit decisions. Thus, we hypothesise that the relationship between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist is characterised by thoroughgoing goal incongruence, and thus to conclude that agency theory is indeed applicable at all stages of the venture development process. Our study engages this question directly, determining the type, extent, and timing of goal incongruence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs empirically.
Methodology

Data and methodological approach
Our research addresses the question of if goal incongruence exists in the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship, and if when and why goal incongruence might result in opportunistic behaviour. We examine goal congruence at key points in the VC process, using the stages framework of Wright and Robbie (1998) as our point of departure. In addition to examining the negotiation, screening, monitoring and investment realisation stages we hypothesise an additional 'inflection point' where goal incongruence is likely to occur: a firm in crisis. Unlike most previous research, we do not use imperfect proxies for identifying goal incongruence, but rather follow Arthurs and Busenitz' (2003) suggestion to ask the actors to get direct data. We put particular emphasis on asking all relevant actors (both entrepreneurs and venture capitalist) to make sure we capture the full picture and clearly specify the areas of incongruence. This has rarely been done in entrepreneurship research because it is notoriously hard to get access to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Another element of our innovative methodological approach is that we focus on a firm in crisis, while most previous research has an inherent survivorship bias by focusing on successful firms. Since goal incongruence arguably is particularly relevant when things do not go as planned, this is an important methodological contribution to shed light on the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship.
The empirical context of our research is a single case study, Alpha Inc., 1 a VC-backed firm in the European energy technology sector (see Section 3.2 for detailed description of the case). One of the researchers had previously worked at one of the VC firms that invested in Alpha. As a result we had a unique opportunity to conduct an in-depth qualitative case study of a failed venture at a point in time just before the firm filed for bankruptcy. Due to the timing, interviewees were eager to share insights they would otherwise have kept for themselves, willing to digest their experiences, and collectively embarked on an attempt to understand the reasons for both the previous successes during several financing rounds and the ultimate failure. If the same study had been conducted a year later, interviewees would have been less involved, had a lower propensity to share their insights, and would have suffered from retrospective bias (Huber and Power, 1985; Golden, 1992) . As little qualitative research has been conducted encompassing both venture capitalists and the startup team (e.g., Sweeting and Wong, 1997; Steier and Greenwood, 1995) , we chose to concentrate our efforts on this single unsuccessful startup and its investors in order to gain deep knowledge about the subject.
We conducted a set of 14 semi-structured interviews with Alpha founders, members of the management team, investing venture capitalists, and one non-investing venture capitalist as external expert. Table 1 shows the data sources in detail. It should be noted that to ensure reliability and validity, all primary interviews were led by one of the co-authors who had been independent of the investment process. Table 1 Data sources
Primary sources of data Secondary sources of data
Three preliminary interviews with entrepreneurs
Four interviews with entrepreneurs
Four interviews with investors (of which one telephone interview)
One interview with a VC who followed the developments but did not invest in Alpha Inc.
(External expert)
Two additional interviews with Alpha Inc. investors by one of the co-authors
Confidential due diligence material prepared by one of the co-authors while he was working with one of the investing VC funds
Publicly accessible information on Alpha Inc.
Academic papers
Prior to each interview, the interviewees were informed about the background and intention of the interview. The reason for this was twofold; the information served to convince the interviewee to agree to an interview whilst also achieving the 'informed consent' of the interviewee (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . Following Eisenhardt (1989b) , each interview guide was prepared on the basis of the a priori constructs obtained from theory and insights from previous interviews. Additionally, interview questions targeted subjects that the researchers believed the interviewee would have specific knowledge about. Accordingly, a new interview guide was prepared for each interview, though with mostly consistent themes. During the semi-structured interviews, the interviewer only decided on the themes and questions; the interviewees were encouraged to choose the importance of each subject and elaborate on themes important to the interviewee (Yin, 2003) . Interviews were conducted in English or German depending on interviewee preference.
Consequently, some of the material and quotations used have been subject to translation. All formal interviews were recorded and transcribed to support reflection on behalf of the researcher as well as to ensure a higher level of objectivity.
The sample of interviewees was chosen to be the aggregate group of people who had been involved directly in the VC-Alpha Inc. relationships, ranging from the complete management of Alpha Inc. to the relevant analysts and management of the investors. Additionally, interviewees were asked to identify knowledgeable insiders and outsiders to obtain insights from people who were not directly involved, and thus were able to provide information with less and/or other predispositions. In other words the sampling strategy was a combination of the 'criterion' and 'snowball' methods (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . Of the pool of potential interviewees, interviews were obtained with four of the eight founders/early recruited informants, the two lead investors, and two of the remaining five financial investors. Additionally, outsider information was obtained by an interview with a venture capitalist who had followed the development of Alpha Inc. We terminated sampling when redundancy with respect to new information was reached, that is when the amount of new information provided per unit had reached the point of diminishing returns (Eisenhardt, 1989b) .
Though data collection and data analysis was an iterative process that led data collection to continue throughout the formation of the general logic and the first stages of the analysis, the analysis process was structured as follows:
To identify when goal incongruence occurs, the analysis started by investigating which parties in the VC-startup relationship can potentially have incongruent goals. The next step was to identify potential goals of the parties from the data and to group observations into relevant themes. Subsequently, the data was arranged in a rough timeline, whilst considering the identified themes.
In order to discover when and why opportunistic behaviour occurs, we divided goal incongruence into two categories: distributive and derived. Distributed goal incongruence is characterised by one party reaching a goal by directly violating interests of other parties, whereas derived goal incongruence infringes others' interests as a secondary effect. To illustrate, a venture capitalist using negotiating leverage with the entrepreneur to drive down initial valuation of the firm, altering the share of the distribution and increasing his expected return at the expense of the existing owners is an example of distributed goal incongruence. In contrast, an example of derived goal incongruence is a venture capitalist with a strategic interest in a particular technology influencing the startup to develop its product using that technology over another that would yield a higher return on capital. The company grows, all parties receive lower return on capital, but the venture capitalist receives a private benefit (perhaps higher valuation for other portfolio companies).
Lastly, factors that enable the parties to act contrary to the interests of other parties were identified, followed by reasons why parties would be more or less prone to opportunistic behaviour, given this ability. The findings from this main analysis thus serve as a basis to discuss how this corresponds to the assumptions of agency theory.
Case description: Alpha Inc.
Alpha Inc. was founded as a spin-off from a German automaker, where a group of engineers had been developing a new concept for a very low emission engine. While the initial objective was to develop a device that could replace the internal combustion engine in the car, the primary focus changed towards the stationary (micro combined heat and power) market, with auxiliary power units in the automotive market as a second possible application that provided for some upside potential. In 2001, Alpha Inc. succeeded in raising a first round of VC financing, with the corporate VC unit of a large electric utility as the sole investor. To appeal to investors, Alpha Inc. pursued a very ambitious (zero-mistake) development plan, and started parallel developments. Accordingly, the time frame was reduced from the original seven years to four, and the company set-up was increased proportionately. In 2003, Alpha Inc. raised 10 million Euro in additional financing from a syndicate of international VC funds. This second round was led by a European VC specialising in clean energy investments, and included four other venture funds: three corporate (one of the three from North America) and one independent. In late 2004, there was a third investment round (referred to as round B II). The original corporate VC firm from round one, who decided not to invest anymore due to strategic issues with the parent company, was replaced by one additional independent VC organisation. The other investors stayed the same. The number of venture firms involved with Alpha, Inc. testifies to the attractiveness of the deal: the company had received a lot of attention at North US and European Energy Venture Fairs and was considered to be a hot deal by many CleanTech VC firms.
As part of round B II, a new CEO was introduced in late 2004. As the company had started to experience technological problems, the investors were looking for someone to execute a new strategy, replacing the founding team and reducing operating expenses. They also wanted someone with a stronger track record in the stationary market, as most of the founders had a background in (and an affinity to) the automotive sector. In the summer of 2005, the company entered into a crisis that eventually led to bankruptcy at the end of 2005.
Results 1: goal incongruence by stage of the venture capitalist -entrepreneur relationship
Based on our qualitative interview data, we seek to identify and categorise types of incongruence by stage of the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship. The main analysis was structured according to the following logic:
• Identify distinct stages in which the players' situations and thus actions change.
• Identify goal incongruence: Goal incongruence is the main reason for a party to act contrary to the interest of the others. We distinguish distributed and derived goal incongruence for each stage of the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
• Identify opportunistic ability: Certain factors, such as information asymmetries, formal or coercive power enable one party to act opportunistically towards the others.
• Discuss arguments for and against: A party is likely to make a more or less conscious cost-benefit analysis of acting opportunistically, in-or decreasing the propensity to do so.
Over the stages of startup development, both goals which were consistent over time and goals which changed depending on situations were identified (Table 2) . 
At the initial investment negotiations
During the negotiation stage distributive goal incongruence dominates the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Information asymmetries enable the startup to oversell its value. This propensity to oversell is not lost on the venture capitalist, who uses contracts and staged investment to reduce this risk (Gompers and Lerner, 2004) . Along with a future dependence on the good relations to the VC, this reduces the propensity for a startup to act opportunistically. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, have two ways of reducing the valuation and improving the terms from their perspective. The venture capitalist can utilise coercive power in order to lower the price and improve the terms:
"In any negotiation, you're as strong as your fall back position is. When you meet a company, you don't ask how much money do you still have, but you ask: 'What is your time line', 'When do you think you'll close', […] and you are actually waiting for people to say that they need to close in four months or something [before they run out of money].
[…] As soon as a venture capitalist realises that you're with your back to the wall, he leans back, time works for him, […] and the prices go down and down…" (VC4, 114.10) Venture capitalists can also leverage information asymmetries to oversell their own value-added, especially the non-financial value. However, both uncovered overselling later on and the lower value of the startup in itself might reduce the motivation of management, potentially reducing the startup performance. As the venture capitalist will have an ownership share in the startup through the investment, the VC will suffer a corresponding share of the lower performance, tempering the propensity of the VC to work towards this goal. Lastly, the lower trust among the parties might lead the startup management to act opportunistically. An incumbent venture capitalist has both a motivation to oversell and undervalue the startup, making the goal of the incumbent dependent on both personal and situational factors.
On the side of derived goal incongruence, syndicates were not identified as being caused by goal incongruence per se. Rather syndication is necessary in order to enlarge the capital base. However, there is a number of goal incongruences associated with syndicates during the initial investment rounds: First, as syndication reduces competition between VCs, the startup valuation might be reduced. On the other hand, syndication increases performance, thus also benefiting the startup in the long run (Brander et al., 2002) . Second, an incumbent VC might have ulterior motives to keep certain VCs outside the syndicate or to invite one external VC to join the syndicate rather than another; if resourcefully strong VCs join, they will dominate the decision-making process later on, enabling them to act contrary to the interests of the other VCs. This is illustrated by the following quote:
"If the start-up valuation goes up to 20 or 30 million, and somebody invests 10 or 15, then what [the small incumbent VC] can add makes no difference. This means that [the incumbent's] shareholdings dilute so much that he has no say, and can only hope for a good exit some day." (Ent1, p.2) Additionally, one VC firm might invite another firm to join in expecting reciprocity later on rather than expected value added, analogous to the quid pro quo explanation for IPO underpricing. An example of a return favour could be as follows:
"Because that other VC once invited [you] to a good deal, then says, 'Really, between the two of us, I have this problem with another company, but I will not in any case accept the failure. We are making another investment round, and you will join too, ok?' Then what do you do?" (VC2, 102.00)
Both might lead to a suboptimal syndicate for the startup. However, if the incumbent VC firm perceives the value of future influence or external firm reciprocity to be higher than the potential value loss of the startup, the incumbent might be tempted to work towards this goal. The incumbent VC firm can utilise overselling, formal and coercive power in order to act opportunistically, thus having a greater range of possibilities than an external VC firm. However, the incumbent VC is tempered in the propensity to act opportunistically:
First, the goals of the VC point towards both a high and a low value, counterbalancing each other. The internal VC has the same arguments as an external VC to abstain from acting opportunistically towards the startup, such as potentially lower future value of the startup and increased risk of opportunistic behaviour, but due to the ownership share obtained over the previous rounds, the dependency on startup success has been increased, reducing the propensity for opportunism. Towards the external VCs, the mutual future dependency is a major argument against it. The findings illustrate that both startups and venture capitalists can engage in opportunistic behaviour. Both parties have a motivation, goal incongruence, opportunistic ability, information advantages, and/or formal and coercive power. Accordingly, it is questioned which party should be defined as the principal and the agent according to agency theory, as it is suggested that the principal utilises the contract for protection from the opportunistic behaviour of the agent.
Second, more than information asymmetries, leverage is important in enabling opportunistic behaviour. In agency theory a clear distinction between principal and agent exists, defining the principal as the owner. Ownership grants full formal power to the principal. Thus in a situation in which the principal has full ownership, the coercive power of the agent is limited, especially as the principal can replace the agent. However, in the VC -startup relationship the ownership changes over time, leading formal and coercive power to supplement informational asymmetries in enabling opportunistic behaviour. Third, opportunistic behaviour falls into two categories. The first is labelled 'overselling', and is made possible by information asymmetries, as shown in the last chapter. This is similar to 'adverse selection' in agency theory terminology, which is defined as misrepresentation by the agent as to his/her abilities (van Osnabrugge, 2000) . The second category of opportunistic behaviour occurs when one player utilises a combination of leverage and information asymmetries to accomplish a goal that directly or indirectly compromises the goals of other parties. Though 'moral hazard' arguably is a more accurate term, this will be labelled 'opportunistic optimisation' in order inhibit confusion with moral hazard in agency theory. The definition is broader than that of moral hazard within agency theory. Moral hazard refers to the situation when the agent does not put forth the effort agreed upon in the contract, and the case when the agent takes on risky investments of a given mean return instead of safer investments, because the agent only benefits from returns when the company is making a profit rather than in a bankrupt state (van Osnabrugge, 2000) . Accordingly, moral hazard only refers to the post-investment opportunistic behaviour of the agent, and thus does not consider opportunistic behaviour at investment due to formal or especially coercive power during negotiations. Opportunistic optimisation refers to any player acting opportunistically ex ante and ex post investment compromising the goals of others directly or indirectly, utilising any methods supporting this goal.
The findings are supported by the a priori constructs from the review of agency theory and entrepreneurship. First, opportunistic behaviour does exist in the VC -startup relationship and is (partially) reduced by the investment contract. However, it should be noted that the contract is only one of several factors reducing opportunistic behaviour on the side of the startup. Second, it is clear that all parties act opportunistically, confirming that the one-sided focus of current research is too simplistic. Third, agency theory assumes that the agent will act opportunistically towards the principal, who dictates the contract in order to reduce this behaviour. However, with full ownership, the principal has full leverage over the agent. Conversely, in the VC -startup relationship, no clear separation between owner and manager exists, which allows for formal and coercive power to enable opportunistic behaviour along with information asymmetries.
Between investment rounds
Between investment rounds, distributive goal incongruence disappears, leaving only derived goal incongruence between the parties. Accordingly, opportunistic behaviour regarding distributive goal incongruence was only identified in anticipation to the following investment rounds.
Regarding derived goal incongruence, startup management might seek to reduce dependence on the VCs by securing alternative sources of capital. As this is relatively easy to recognise for VCs, this is primarily possible in the event of sufficient formal power of startup management.
On the side of the VCs, syndication leads to a free-rider problem: lower individual ownership proportions for each VC lead to a lower propensity to add non-financial value. Though this can hardly be argued to be opportunistic behaviour in itself, it is a result of the VCs' policies to spread investments through syndication, and thus the goals of VCs and startups being incongruent.
Further, a Corporate VC (CVC) might work to influence strategy towards the interests of his parent corporation. As this is likely to reduce startup performance, this is only possible to the extent that the CVC has formal or coercive power that enables this, or information asymmetries conceal the action.
Lastly, there is a discrepancy regarding risk between the VCs and the startup, depending on the following hypothesis:
A Venture Capitalist will earn more on the aggregate portfolio by increasing the risk and thus potential reward in each portfolio company, accepting a greater proportion of unsuccessful startups.
In this case, the VCs work actively to increase risk in their startups, as this will increase the mean return on investment on the aggregate portfolio of startups.
The findings support and nuance the findings regarding the initial investment negotiations. Again, opportunistic behaviour on both the side of the startup and of the VCs was identified, questioning which of them should be labelled the principal and the agent. Second, distributive goal incongruence does not exist between investment rounds, thus obliterating overselling. Accordingly, 'opportunistic optimisation', dominates this stage, which in turn is enabled by information asymmetries, formal and coercive power. Lastly, it is thus necessary to focus on leverage along with information asymmetries to get a complete picture of opportunistic ability. Additionally, the findings nuance the discussion of the a priori constructs. First, it seems as if agency theory does not have much explanatory ability between investment rounds if the VC is assumed to be the principal and the startup is the agent. As predicted by Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) the VC trusts the startup to act in their common interest. On the other hand, if the startup is assumed to be the principal, the opportunistic behaviour of the VC is predicted. Moreover, the VC utilises leverage as an important tool to reach opportunistic optimisation.
Subsequent investment rounds
The situation at subsequent investment rounds is similar to that of initial investment rounds. As the distributive goals are misaligned, both startups and VCs are likely to try to oversell their value or value added, though the potential is lower than at previous rounds, due to lower information asymmetries, as the parties get to know each other. However, compared to previous rounds opportunistic ability will go up for VCs and down for the startup management. In contrast the opportunistic propensity will go down for VCs and be neutral or go up for startup management. The changes in both opportunistic ability and propensity are primarily results of the changing ownership proportions at this stage.
The findings of this stage are consistent with those of the previous stages. Both startup and VCs are identified as having a motive and ability to exercise opportunistic behaviour. Though no new themes were identified regarding opportunistic optimisation, several of the negotiations discussed previously at 'Between investment rounds' are argued to occur at this stage. Accordingly, both overselling and opportunistic optimisation can be identified at this stage.
Regarding the a priori constructs from the theory chapter, the findings from this chapter are not entirely consistent with the predictions of Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) , as the distributive goals are misaligned. Even though the predictions from theory did not support that the opportunistic ability should rise after the initial investment, it is argued that the situation at the initial and subsequent investment rounds are so similar that the findings of Arthurs and Busenitz are refined rather than refuted.
Crisis situation
In a crisis situation distributive goals dominate, largely due to the shrinking of the startup value to be shared among the owners. If the startup management cannot see a mutual gain any more, it will be tempted to act opportunistically to the extent possible, or leave the company. However, as the crisis is likely to severely inhibit formal and coercive power of management, the opportunistic ability is limited.
VCs, however, are likely to seek a greater share of the company ownership, primarily through clauses in the contract. If they agree that further redistribution of ownership share is preferable, one means is to decide on an investment round with an artificially low valuation for existing shareholders only, thus diluting the ownership share of non-investing parties, i.e., startup management. This can be done as follows:
"We make a follow up round for the last round, and calculate a mixture valuation, because we all noticed that the valuation of the last round had been too high.
[…] we make a round B II at extremely low valuation to correct for the valuation that was too high in the last round. An external would only participate in the downside, and we don't want to give them the low valuation as a present.
[…] You make the correction, and then it will hopefully go up again." (VC2, 36.50) Further, a financially strong VC has the option to utilise information asymmetries to act opportunistically towards other VCs by making them abstain from investing, and thus dilute their shareholdings in the same manner as for the management in the quote above. This means that the non-investing VCs lose ownership shares and influence over developments. It is thus evident that VCs build in clauses to protect against both bad performance on the side of the startup, but also in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour among VCs.
In the category of derived goals, a VC might try to oversell a struggling startup in order to postpone a write-off, as the bankruptcy would weaken the VC's position during the next fundraising. This is similar to the 'window dressing' argument by Gompers and Lerner (2004) , where the VC improves the track record by investing in successful startups during late stages. The cost benefit analysis of the VC will be between the immediate benefits of the better financing conditions at the fundraising and the long-term disadvantages of a potentially lower reputation.
The above arguments demonstrate that VCs are more likely to act in an opportunistic manner the closer the startup is to a life-threatening crisis. Further, this period is the most powerful example of leverage enabling opportunistic behaviour as well as information asymmetries. Both leverage and information asymmetries are thus central to one VC being able to act opportunistically towards another, as shown in the previous example.
It is also shown that though agency theory applies to the VC-E relationship, the aspect of startup opportunistic behaviour is largely irrelevant in a crisis situation compared to VC opportunistic behaviour. Interestingly, the low risk of opportunistic behaviour during a crisis is primarily due to the low opportunistic ability of the startup management rather than goals aligned with the VCs.
It can thus be hypothesised that the main reason why VCs do not fear opportunistic behaviour on the side of the startup management is due to two factors: In positive periods, the main goal of the startup management is startup success, which is also in the interest of the VCs. If the startup faces a crisis, the leverage of the management is reduced so much that opportunistic behaviour is fairly unlikely.
However, on the side of the VCs the leverage and incentive structure is complex. Most importantly, the leverage of powerful VCs increases over time, enabling them to act opportunistically not only towards the startup, but also towards other VCs. Thus it is hypothesised that a significant part of the investment contract of a startup concerns protection against opportunistic behaviour among the VCs rather than by the startup. Additionally, this protection is unlikely to be dictated by the startup, but rather by other VCs.
Towards a positive liquidation
In moving towards a positive liquidation, only derived goal incongruence was identified. On the side of the management, personal egos, self-images or wishes for independence might obstruct the best liquidation options for the VCs.
On the side of the VCs, the wish for better terms during the next fundraising might collide with the 'optimal' exit timing regarding pricing, which Gompers (1996) labelled grandstanding.
Again, leverage is the most important determinant regarding opportunistic ability, whilst only the future relationship to other VCs might temper the VCs' propensity to exploit the situation to the extent possible.
Results II: opportunistic behaviour between actors in the venture capitalist -entrepreneur relationship
An important finding of this paper is that opportunistic behaviour can be due to one player directly gaining from acting against the interests of another, but also due to one player weighing one goal higher than another, accepting the trade-off. These were labelled distributive and derived goal incongruence respectively. The second finding is that the relationship between the parties is fundamentally different in various situations: During negotiations towards investment rounds and during crises, distributive goal incongruence dominate derived goal incongruence, whereas only derived goal incongruence exist between investment rounds and when working towards a successful exit. Accordingly, the relationship between VCs and startup can be described as a circle between situations dominated by distributive goals and situations in which only derived goal incongruence exist. Depending on which situation the startup is in at liquidation, this determines whether the liquidation is 'positive' or 'negative' (see Figure 1 ). The following table gives an overview of which goals were identified and how they can be achieved. It should be noted that influence was both identified to be a goal and an enabling factor, in that players are able to act opportunistically in order to secure influence that will enable further opportunistic behaviour at a later stage. Second, it was found that in addition to information asymmetries, leverage is a decisive factor in determining whether one actor can act opportunistically or not. Accordingly, other parties can be fully aware of what the opportunistically acting party is doing, but may not be able to prevent it due to the formal or coercive power of the opponent. Information asymmetries and leverage thus both contribute to the aggregate opportunistic ability of a party. Third, opportunistic behaviour was found to fall into two categories, 'overselling' and 'opportunistic optimisation'. Whilst overselling is made possible by information asymmetries and corresponds to 'adverse selection' in agency theory terminology, opportunistic optimisation occurs when one player utilises a combination of leverage and information asymmetries to accomplish a goal which directly or indirectly compromises the goals of other parties. Thus, given goal incongruence and either information asymmetries and/or leverage, any player is able to act opportunistically towards any other player. Opportunistic optimisation denotes an extension of moral hazard in agency theory; as the principal has full ownership, formal and coercive power is not considered. Thus moral hazard only refers to the ex post investment opportunistic behaviour of the agent. Opportunistic optimisation, however, includes leverage and thus occurs both before and after the initial investment, as one party is able to utilise coercive power to act opportunistically without ownership prior to investment.
Lastly, it was found that despite incongruence and opportunistic ability, a player is partially deterred from acting opportunistically through contractual clauses and 'natural' counterbalances such as shouldering part of the incurred cost. The following table gives an overview of the division between the distributive and derived goal incongruence for each relationship, and their temporal and causal relations.
As argued above, the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour consists of three elements; Goal incongruence, opportunistic ability, and the perceived costs and benefits of opportunistic behaviour. However, they influence the likelihood in different ways: Goal incongruence and opportunistic ability both serve as prerequisites for opportunistic behaviour, whilst the perceived cost-benefit balance influences the propensity of a party to engage in opportunistic behaviour even if goal incongruence and opportunistic ability motivate and enable the party to do so.
Discussion
A call for better specification of the use of agency theory
Agency theory has cast a long shadow over entrepreneurship research generally (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and remains the dominant explanatory framework for analysing the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. The continued use of agency theory is due in no small part to strong empirical support in both management and finance literature (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1994) . However as Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) note, a small collection of studies question the efficacy of agency theory on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Fortunately for researchers of all persuasions, options remain open: for advocates of agency theory one can argue for better measures (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994) or select another theoretical perspective (Cable and Shane, 1997; Busenitz et al., 2001; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996) . However, proposing a reduced scope due to goal incongruence is not supported by the data.
It is argued that goal (in)congruence between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur -specifically, the presence of it during the negotiation stage of the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship and the relative absence of it in future stages -reduces the applicability of agency theoretic perspectives to key points in the process. On the contrary, we find evidence for thoroughgoing goal incongruence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs at all stages of the relationship.
In addition, we note that when agency theory has been suggested, tested or discounted as an explanatory framework in entrepreneurship and VC research, the stylised 'venture capitalist-as-principal, entrepreneur-as agent' model has been taken as axiomatic. We suggest that this is an inappropriate mischaracterisation of the relationship between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur, and argue that along with good measures (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994) it is critical to correctly conceptualise the principal-agent relationship in the VC context when advancing arguments based on agency theory. Interviews confirm that venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and venture partners are aware of opportunities to be predatory, and to be prey, at each stage of venture development. Our findings compliment a growing collection of research into the implications of this bi-directional relationship (Gifford, 1997; Baker, 2000; Gompers, 1996; Lee and Wahal, 2004) . Our findings suggest that we need to re-conceptualise the principal-agent issue in the VC context if we plan to incorporate an agency theory perspective in VC research.
The relevance of 'smart money' in a new investment sector
Another aspect of our finding is that venture capitalists advertise to potential entrepreneurs that they provide 'smart capital' because they do not just provide financial capital, but also management support to their portfolio companies. However, as the entrepreneurs from Alpha Inc. remarked in our interviews, despite their good brand names, many of the venture capitalists involved in the deal had very little first-hand experience with the specific industry. In fact, many did not have a lot of experience in growing entrepreneurial companies, either. This is somewhat representative of a new industry, and since clean tech VC is a new investment sector, many of the professionals engaged in active management of these funds have mixed backgrounds. Often they do not have a track record in VC, and more often than not the bulk of their professional expertise was outside the energy industry.
"You know, every VC sells himself as adding more than just money, but I see very few doing that." (VC4, 139.00)
Limitations and suggestions for further research
While we believe that our research provides important contributions to the discussion about using an agency theory perspective in research on entrepreneurship and venture capital, we would also like to highlight some of the limitations of the present study that suggest opportunities for further research.
First, our empirical design is limited to a single case study with one startup firm. Further research should test our findings in larger samples of successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurial firms, and also confirm the types of goal incongruence that we have identified, or possibly identifying further categories.
Second, the main focus of this paper was on goal incongruence and opportunistic behaviour in the (two-way) VC -entrepreneur relationship. We touched rather briefly upon potential agency problems in the relationship between VC firms in the context of syndicated investments. We believe that this deserves explicit attention in further research.
A third avenue for research is to look at an additional, unexamined area of potential goal incongruence: the different risk appetite of VC investors versus entrepreneurs. Some of our interview results indicated that venture capitalists might have a higher propensity to take significant risk in each single portfolio company, driving it either towards higher performance or out of business. An entrepreneur, on the other hand, may be more risk averse and have a higher propensity to avoid the risk of failure. If this can be confirmed in further empirical work, it would point to an additional area of agency problems in the venture capitalist -entrepreneur relationship.
Conclusions
This paper advances the literature on entrepreneurial finance in several ways. This case study adds new insights on the boundaries and potential limitations of agency theory in a VC context. We hypothesised that the relationship between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist is characterised by thoroughgoing goal incongruence, and thus advancing the proposition that agency theory is indeed applicable at all stages of the venture development process. Our findings determined the type, extent, and timing of goal incongruence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs empirically.
In addition to the identification of entrepreneurial opportunism at every stage of the relationship, this also discloses an under-examined aspect of the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship: the potential for opportunistic behaviour of the venture capitalist. Interview evidence suggests that opportunistic venture capitalists drive down firm valuation through negotiation at initial and subsequent stages; may or may not provide monitoring, advice, or attention due to benign or active neglect; and are capable of making self-serving reinvestment or exit decisions. These findings align with a growing collection of theoretical and empirical work in the entrepreneurial finance literature, and lead us to conclude along with Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) that re-conceptualising the relationship between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur is required to advance our understanding of this complex and nuanced phenomenon.
